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1963] COMMENTS 955 
TRADE R.EGULATION-ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac-r-PrucE DISCRIM-
INATION IN THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE-Section 2 of the orig-
inal Clayton Act1 was directed primarily at geographical price 
discrimination which was destructive of competition among sell-
ers.2 The major source of anti-competitive behavior which the act 
sought to eliminate was the practice by which a number of large 
national corporations slashed prices in areas in which they had 
local competition in order to force their smaller rivals from the 
market.3 In response, the act prohibited price discriminations 
which threatened "to substantially lessen competition or tend to 
1 Ch. !12!1, !18 Stat. 7!10 (1914). 
2 Arr'v: GEN. NAT"L Co:\IM. ANTITRUST REP. 155 (1955) [hereinafter cited as A.G. REP.]. 
S See Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1956). 
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create a monopoly in any line of commerce" unless such price 
differentials resulted from <lifferences in the grade, quality, quan-
tity, or cost of sale or transportation, or were "made in good faith 
to meet competition."4 
The emergence of chain stores and mail-order houses in the 
1920's posed a new threat to competition; this time at the retail 
level. The quantity purchase discounts which large buyers could 
exact placed the small independent merchant at a competitive dis-
advantage so substantial as to cast doubt upon his continued pres-
ence in the competitive picture.5 To prevent these competitive 
advantages, which were felt to be unfair and undesirable, Congress, 
in 1936, passed the Robinson-Patman Act6 which, in part, amended 
section 2 of the Clayton Act.7 The effect of the amendment was 
to tighten the application of the quantity purchase defense so 
as i:o require a strict cost justification for price differentials.8 
In short, this legislation was intended to prevent price discrimi-
nation destructive of competition among buyers,° as well as among 
sellers. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GASOLINE MARKET 
The marketing of gasoline has many distinctive features.10 
4 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
5 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1948). 
6 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). 
7 For a full discussion of the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, see 
ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 3--23 (1962) [hereinafter 
cited as RmVE]. 
8 The statute provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce . . • to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities 
of like grade and quality ••• where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially 
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 
injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly 
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, 
That nothing • • • shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for dif• 
ferences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods 
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered •.•• " 
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958). 
9 A.G. REP. 155. 
10 The general statements made in this section are conclusions of the writer drawn 
from a study of the following sources: CASSADY, PRICE MAKING AND PRICE BEHAVIOR IN 
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1959); CASSADY &: JONES, THE NATURE OF COMPETITION IN 
GASOLINE DISTRIBUTION AT THE RETAIL LEVEL (1951); DE CHAZEAU &: KAHN, INTEGRATION 
AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1959); McLEAN &: HAIGH, THE GROWTH 
OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES (1954); Ros-row, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 
(1948); 1 WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES 95-187 (1958); Dirlam &: Kahn, Leadership and 
Conflict in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L.J. 818 (1952); Learned, Pricing of Gasoline: 
A Case Study, 26 HARv. Bus. REv. 723 (1948); McGee, Price Discrimination and Com-
petitive Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 398 (1956); 
Comment, Conscious Parallelism in the Pricing of Gasoline, 32 RocKY MT. L. REv. 206 
(1960); Comment, Price Discrimination in Gasoline Marketing: The Detroit Jobbers 
Case, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 58 (1951). 
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Although a large number of companies of varying size participate 
in the overall refining and marketing process, a predominant pro-
portion of the total output is controlled by approximately twenty-
two major oil companies, all of rather large size.11 The principal 
finished product of the industry, gasoline, is quite standardized, 
with little real physical difference between the various brands. 
Hence, there is no rational basis for a difference in price between 
competing brands in any one market area; and, in any given mar-
ket area at any given time, the demand for gasoline is completely 
inelastic. This means that an industry-wide decrease in the price 
of gasoline will have no corresponding increase in the demand for 
gasoline, with the converse also being true. On the other hand, 
however, the demand for any one dealer's supply is extremely 
elastic, and a decrease (or increase) in his price will, in the absence 
of a corresponding change in the price of his competitors, result 
in a substantial increase (or decrease) in the volume of sales for 
that company or its dealers. 
The production of gasoline requires that the major oil com-
panies make extremely large investments in production facilities, 
pipelines and refineries. To reduce costs per unit, the refining 
process must be operated at maximum capacity, and without costly 
stoppages. Therefore, the gasoline supply is rather difficult to limit.12 
Consequently, the resulting supply must be disposed of in available 
markets at available prices, and the resulting abundance leads to 
an intense competition among the major oil companies to increase 
their sales volume. The need to dispose of the available supply of 
gasoline often exceeds the refining company's willingness or ability 
to sell it under its own brand name. The result is that the major 
refiners have been willing to sell increasing quantities of gasoline 
11 Several of these are among the largest corporations in the United States. Four of 
the ten largest industrial corporations in the United States arc oil companies, with assets of 
more than $20 billion and sales of more than $17 billion. The 500 Largest U.S. Industrial 
Corporations, Fortune, July 1962, pp. 171-90. In addition, the propensity for growth of 
the major oil companies is quite pronounced. In the eleven-year period, 1951 through 
1961, of the thirty-two petroleum companies among the top 500 industrial corporations, 
all but five made acquisitions. Two acquired more than twenty other companies, and 
four purchased ten or more. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION: ACQUISITIONS OF 500 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL AND 50 
LARGES'I' MERCHANDISING FIRMS 31 (Comm. Print 1962). 
12 The 27½% depletion allowance granted under the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, § 613(b), has been alleged to be a contributing factor to the excessive supply of 
gasoline being produced. Another reason for excess gasoline supplies lies in the fact 
that "for every two barrels of heating oils extracted from crude, refiners must produce 
three barrels of gasoline." As a result, in cold spells when refiners are forced to step up 
crude runs to meet extra heavy demands for heating oils, gasoline stocks are pushed 
higher than necessary. The Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1963, p. 20. 
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to jobbers to be sold under private brand names.13 This surplus 
gasoline is usually sold for whatever it will bring,14 and this is 
generally less than the price to the major's own dealers. Because 
of the high degree of standardization of the product, brand loyalty 
is not sufficient to overcome the appeal of a lower price offered by 
a competing brand. Therefore, a price reduction by one major 
mus~ be matched by all others if their respective sales volumes 
are to be maintained.115 As a result, price competition among the 
majors is virtually non-existent on the supplier level.1<1 The prac-
tical effect of this lack of competition is that the price in any one 
market area is effectively established by the market leader in that 
area.17 The possibility of artificially high prices resulting from the 
absence of price competition, combined with an excessive supply 
of gasoline, has created a favorable situation for the growth of 
independent or non-major oil companies.':,8 
The independent or non-major companies19 have in fact cap-
tured a large share of the market and have increased their sales 
significantly in recent years.20 Although many independents gained 
their initial acceptance by offering the motorist gifts or premiums, 
their primary appeal has been in the lower prices charged. The 
independents have been able to charge lower prices because they 
normally have lower costs; they usually engage in no advertising; 
they perform no servicing which calls for high-paid labor; and 
they have no credit cards. Lower prices are also explained by 
consumer loyalty to brand names which forces the independents 
to charge less than the major brands in order to remain competi-
13 The major oil companies supplied about 75% of the private-brand gasoline sold 
in 1958. Private Brander: He's Confident, Nat'l Petroleum News, Feb. 1958, p. 137. 
14 See DE CHAZEAU &: KAHN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 466. 
15 See Note, The Good Faith Defense of the Robinson-Patman Act: A New Restriction 
Appraised, 66 YALE L.J. 935, 940-41 (1957). 
16 The same holds true under normal circumstances for the dealers on their level 
also, although there are many cases of non-conforming dealers because of particular local 
situations. Dealers will often engage in identical pricing on a local level to maintain 
an artificially high price level, and this is often beyond the reach of the federal antitrust 
laws. See Comment, 32 RocKY MT. L. REv. 206 (1960). 
17 See Dirlam &: Kahn, supra note 10, at 823-26. 
18 On the growth of non-major oil companies, see McGee, supra no·te 10, at 413-16. 
19 The dividing line between a "major" and a !'non-major," or "independent," oil 
company is not clearly drawn. Major oil companies are vertically integrated in that 
they engage in every branch of the business and operate on every functional level-
owning and operating oil wells, pipelines, refineries, bulk storage plants, and some 
service stations. Generally, a non-major does not own its own refinery, or, if it does, 
the refinery is usually small. The non-majors usually own and operate their own service 
stations rather than leasing them to independent dealers. United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 166 n.4 (1940); Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 467 n.3 
(5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (1963). 
20 It has been estimated that the independents accounted for 10% of the national 
gasoline sales in 1948 and for nearly 25% in 1958. Bus. Week, May 17, 1958, p. 66. 
1963] COMMENTS 959 
tively alive. As they have gained consumer acceptance, however, 
the size of the price differential has decreased. At the present time, 
private brands generally sell at a differential of about two cents 
a gallon at retail below the major brands.21 The prevailing theory 
has been that a two-cent differential between major and non-major 
brands allows maintenance of the competitive status quo. When 
the differential increases, however, the non-majors gain business 
and the majors lose business.22 
On the retail level, gasoline today is marketed through single-
supplier stations23-the split pump stations of earlier days having 
passed out of the picture. The three predominant types of supply 
arrangements24 are lessee-dealers,25 consignment stations,26 and 
company owned and/or operated stations.27 
21 DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 466. See also Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 
294 F.2d 465, 482 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (1963); American Oil Co., 3 TRADE 
RE<:. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1f 15961, at 20788 (FTC June 27, 1962), appeal docketed, 3 TRADE 
REG. REP. 25901 (7th Cir. March 4, 1963). 
22 See Note, Competition in Gasoline Retailing: A Price War, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 
644, 645 (1953). The attempt of Standard Oil (Indiana) to maintain a differential no 
greater than 2¢ a gallon, in markets where it tended to be greater, by means of a 
"Suggested Competitive Retail Price" plan, resulted in the issuance of a price-fixing 
complaint by the Federal Trade Commission. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 3 TRADE REG. REP. 
(Trade Cas.) 1f 16128 (FTC Oct. 5, 1962) (initial decision dismissing the complaint), 
petition for appeal filed, BNA ANTITRusr TRADE REG. REP. No. 69, at C-1 (Oct. 25, 1962). 
23 Exclusive dealing clauses in the leases or supply contracts requiring the dealer 
to deal only in the products of the supplier company are invalid, however, under § 3 
of the Clayton Act, when their effect "may be to substantially lessen competition." 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). However, the practice of leasing 
underground tanks and pumps to retail dealers at nominal prices and upon condition 
that the equipment be used only with gasoline supplied by the lessor was held not to be 
an illegal tying arrangement under § 3 of the Clayton Act, so long as there was no 
covenant obligating the lessee not to sell the goods of another. FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 
261 U.S. 463 (1923). 
24 There are actually more than three types, and several means of classification are 
possible. For a list of ten of the most common arrangements, see McLEAN & HAIGH, op. cit. 
supra note 10, at 14. 
25 This term is used here to indicate a dealer who leases the station from the 
supplier who either owns it, or leases it from a third party. There are even some cases 
where the dealer himself owns the station and/or the land and leases it to the supplier 
who then leases it back to the dealer. The leases generally provide for termination, upon 
notice by the company, in periods as short as ten days. Theoretically, the lessee-dealer 
is free to set his own price for the gasoline he sells. 
20 The term is used here to denote any type of station which obtains its gasoline 
from the supplier by consignment. The dealer in such a case earns a commission on 
the gasoline he sells as agent for the supplier. Such an arrangement gives the supplier 
the right to control the retail price. Consignment arrangements arc outside the Robinson-
Patman Act. RowE 51. So far as the Robinson-Patman Act is concerned, the supplier 
may selectively engage in consignment arrangements. Id. at 52. However, such plans have 
been attacked by the FTC under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as an unfair 
method of competition by reason of alleged abuse for coercion and price-fixing purposes. 
In one case, an FTC hearing examiner held that the dealers were coerced into the con-
signment plan, and that it was not a bona fide consignment, but rather a fiction or sub-
terfuge merely to enable the supplier to fix the retail price with its dealers. Sun Oil Co., 
3 TRADE RE<:. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1f 15909 (FTC May 17, 1962). But, in another case, the 
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A. Generally 
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Section 2 of the amended Clayton Act prohibits price discrim-
inations which have the probable effect of substantially lessening 
competition or tending to create a monopoly in any line of 
commerce, or injuring, destroying or preventing competition with 
anyone who grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such a 
discrimination.28 While the act aims at halting or preventing in-
juries to competition on any level, the discriminations attacked 
are generally on one of the two principal levels: the seller level 
(primary line competition), or the buyer level (secondary line 
competition). A frequent type of discrimination on the seller level 
exists where a manufacturer, selling products nationwide, low-
ers his prices in one local area to drive out of the market a com-
petitor operating only in that particular area. The manufacturer, 
in such a case, subsidizes his local losses by maintaining his prices 
throughout the rest of the country. The evil to be prevented here 
is predatory pricing in local markets. The typical case of price 
discrimination on the buyer level is where a large purchaser in 
a local market is granted price reductions which enable him to 
sell at lower prices than his competitors, thus substantially injur-
ing competition and tending toward monopoly in the local market 
area. 
B. Price Discrimination in the Gasoline Market 
To establish a violation of section 2(a), the Federal Trade 
Commission must prove: (1) that there has been a price discrimi-
nation,29 (2) in commerce,-(3) among purchasers of commodities 
of like grade and quality, (4) where the effect tends to injure 
competition or create a monopoly. The seller may rebut any of 
these elements, or defend upon the basis of a cost justification for 
hearing examiner held that the oil company had met all the requirements of a valid 
consignment as laid down in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), and 
that the company's retention of control over retail prices under the consignment arrange-
ment with its service station operators was a legal method of helping its independent 
operators survive price wars. Atlantic Ref. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) ,I 15786 
(FTC March 7, 1962). 
21 This term refers to any station operated by the supplier with hired employees. 
All control over the station, including price, is in the supplier. While the majors operate 
a few such stations, the independents operate virtually all their stations on this basis. 
28 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). 
29 "[A] price discrimination within the meaning of that provision is merely a price 
difference ... .'' FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960). 
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the quantity sold. In addition, section 2(b) provides that a seller 
may rebut the prima facie case by showing that its lower price 
"was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor."30 · 
It should be noted that, barring some unusual circumstances, 
a gasoline supplier will not engage in price discrimination at the 
buyer level and thus put its own dealers out of business. Nor 
would it normally engage in area price discrimination because 
the effect would be merely a general price reduction throughout 
the area since the other suppliers would meet the lower price. 
Hence, the price discrimination problem usually arises in a price 
war situation. Price wars can arise in any number of ways: 31 (I) 
a dealer may cut his profit margin to reduce his price and thereby 
gain volume, thus triggering a chain reaction;32 (2) competing 
dealers located in close proximity to each other may agree to 
reduce their prices to draw additional volume into their area, 
each complaining to his supplier, so as to obtain a competitive 
price allowance, that he had to meet the price of the nearby 
dealer;33 (3) an independent, selling substantially below the pre-
vailing price level, may move into the area and force the major 
brand dealers to drop their prices to remain competitive;34 or (4) 
a major company may be over-supplied and attempt to solve the 
problem by dumping its excess in a localized area.35 
so 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958). Another defense available to a seller 
is the "changing conditions" proviso in § 2(a), which in pertinent part declares "that 
nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response 
to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods con-
cerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, 
obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith 
in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 13(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.) For a discussion of the "changing conditions" proviso, 
sec RowE, 323-29; A.G. REP. 177-79. 
31 Sec ITC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 525 (1963). 
32 Often when this happens the oil companies will grant discounts to the surrounding 
dealers to allow them to drop their prices to eliminate the price competition. H.R. REP. 
No. 1423, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955). 
33 See Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 458 (2d Cir. 1957). 
34 One of the most unusual price wars to come to this writer's attention was triggered 
by a sign at a service station stating a low price for cigarettes which competing dealers 
mistook for a gasoline price which they met on their own pumps. 
35 "In a normally competitive industry, an oversupply would result in a general 
lowering of wholesale prices. . • • [But the oil companies, by disposing of their surplus 
gasoline through channels which lead to off-brand dealers] do not directly affect the 
established wholesale price in that part of the market represented by their lessee dealers 
nor do they in any way commit themselves to a general lowering of the wholesale price 
to such dealers. At the same time, the excess gasoline has a serious effect upon the market. 
This market disturbance, however, is usually temporary and is localized by the oil com-
panies 'meeting the competition' of their own gasoline which was sold to off-brand 
dealers ...• The resulting price war may accomplish three objectives: (1) It prevents 
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A recent case will serve to introduce and illustrate the prob-
lems.36 In 1958, a price war developed in the Smyrna-Marietta 
area of Georgia when a Shell station37 (a major brand) located in 
Marietta lowered its prices to meet those of a Paraland station (an 
independent brand) situated across the street.38 In order to aid 
its dealers in competing with the lower prices of Paraland and 
Shell, American, another major, lowered prices to its dealers in 
Marietta in the form of "competitive price allowances" or dis-
counts from the prevailing tank wagon price, without lowering 
prices to its dealers in Smyrna, a town several miles away. At 
times the prices to American dealers in Marietta and Smyrna dif-
fered by as much as five cents to eleven and one-half cents per 
gallon. The evidence tended to establish that competition did 
exist between the favored and non-favored dealers in the resale of 
American gasoline, and that the price difference was sufficient to 
give the favored dealers a significant competitive advantage.39 
Among the defenses offered by American was that it had lowered 
its prices in good faith to meet the equally low price of a compet-
itor-Shell. 
III. THE SECTION 2(B) DEFENSE 
A. The Meeting Competition Requirement 
The FTC has adopted the policy that the defense of a "good 
faith meeting of competition" is inapplicable where the seller re-
duces its prices to help the seller's customer meet that customer's 
competition.40 The defense, according to the Commission, is avail-
able to a supplier only in meeting the supplier's own competition. 
This distinction was established by the Federal District Court for 
Connecticut in Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co./1 and has 
the off-brand dealer from gaining a permanent position in the market; (2) it moves addi-
tional amounts of surplus gasoline through regular brand outlets; and (3) it causes the 
cost of the operation to be borne in part by the brand dealers through the reduction 
and, in many cases, the elimination of their profit margin." H.R. REP. No. 1423, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1955). 
36 American Oil Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1J 15961 (FTC June 27, 1962), 
appeal docketed, 3 TRADE REc. REP. 25901 (7th Cir. March 4, 1963). 
37 The record seems inconclusive as to whether the Shell station was operated by the 
Shell Oil Company, as contended by American Oil, or by an independent lessee-dealer. 
Id. at 20788. 
38 There was some evidence that Paraland was owned by, or affiliated with, Phillips 
Petroleum, a major producer. Dissenting opinion by Commissioner Elman, id. at 20793. 
39 Id. at 20786. 
40 Id. at 20787. 
41 136 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), 
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been endorsed by the Senate Select Committee on Small Business.42 
In that case, the plaintiff had operated a Texaco station on the 
highway near Hartford, Connecticut, and was in competition with 
other stations on the highway and with those in the city. Because 
of a price war, Texaco gave allowances to Hartford dealers so that 
they received gasoline at a lower price than the plaintiff. Plaintiff 
sued for treble damages under section 2(a). The district court re-
jected the use of the section 2(b) defense in such a situation, al-
though it recognized that "perhaps it is a fiction to speak of price 
competition at the oil company sale to the station level" in view 
of the realities of the marketing of gasoline.43 It was this fiction 
which led the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to allow the 
defense in Sun Oil Co. v. FTC.44 Sun had assisted one of its lessee-
dealers, McLean, who was suffering substantial losses in business 
to a nearby non-major service station, Super Test, which was sell-
ing substantially below McLean's price. McLean asked for and, 
after several months, finally received a price allowance or discount 
from Sun to enable him to sell at closer to Super Test's price. This 
allowance was not initially given to Sun's other dealers in the same 
general area. The FTC charged and found Sun to be in violation 
of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, rejecting Sun's asserted defense 
under section 2(b) of the act because Sun was not meeting its own 
competition.45 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the decision was 
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). Prior to this time the Federal Trade Commission had 
taken the opposite view. See testimony by Chairman Gwynne of the Federal Trade 
Commission, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly To Amend 
Section 2 of the Clayton Act of the Senate Committee on the Judidary, 84th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 229-32 (1956). For further evidence as to the Commission's position, see RoWE 250. 
For a criticism of the Enterprise decision, see Note, The Good Faith Defense of the 
Robinson-Patman Act: A New Restriction Appraised, 66 YALE L.J. 935 (1957). "[B]y 
narrowing the scope of section 2(b), the decision aggravates the effect of price wars 
on retailers who are forced to cut their prices to maintain their volume of sales. • • . 
[The] sole effect is to prohibit suppliers from lowering their wholesale prices to help 
their retailers meet a competitor's price cut." Id. at 941. 
42 S. REP. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 28-29 (1956). 
43 Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on 
other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). 
44 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (1963). 
45 Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955 (1959). But see RowE 254-55. "[I]n certain circumstances 
a rival's price may constitute competition for both the seller and the buyer, which both 
must meet or lose the business on which both depend for their common survival. By 
lowering his price selectively to assist a dealer's competitive encounters, the supplier 
can be meeting the equally low price of another supplier, quoted either to the latter's 
dealers or in his company owned stations. Or, the seller granting a temporary dealer 
allowance in a price war situation could, in commercial reality and in contemplation of 
law, 'step into the shoes' of the dealer for the duration of the emergency, so that the 
defensive lower prices quoted by him through his dealer to the public would meet in 
good faith their mutual competitor's equally low price at the pump." 
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reversed. In the marketing of gasoline, the court reasoned, the 
supplier cannot be cut off from the service station operator and 
treated as if it competed only for the business of the service sta-
tions. The competition between suppliers is for the consumer's 
business. "The filling station operator is a conduit between the 
supplier and the motoring public."46 
The "conduit" theory relied upon by the Fifth Circuit is not 
new. Mr. Justice Jackson expressed it in his dissenting opinion 
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.41 In one sense, ~very retailer 
is merely the conduit through which a manufacturer gets his goods 
to the consumer market, but the "conduit" theory should not 
become the vehicle by which the supplier obtains the control 
associated with vertical integration without also incurring the 
inherent burdens. At one time, vertical integration in the oil 
industry was the rule rather than the exception. The retail serv-
ice stations were under the direct salaried control of the supplying 
oil companies. The abandonment of direct salary operation was 
the result of a severe chain store tax law adopted in Iowa which, 
in 1935, caused practically every refiner and jobber to lease out 
all their company-owned and operated stations in that state.48 
Many companies subsequently adopted the "Iowa Plan" when 
they discovered that it was more profitable, under the economic 
circumstances of the late 1920's and 1930's, to lease their stations 
than to operate them themselves. Leasing added a new source of 
income in the form of rent. In addition, the private control factor 
often led dealers to increase the gallonage sales of the station, 
which, in turn, increased the profits of the oil company. Moreover, 
the rent was tied to the gallonage and increased with increased 
volume.49 Independent dealer operation also removed from the 
supplying oil company the burdens of unemployment, social se-
curity, and workmen's compensation taxes, and minimum wage 
rate laws, as well as labor union difficulties.50 Having deliberately 
46 Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 477 (5th Cir. 1961). 
47 337 U.S. 293, 323 (1949). "[T]he retailer in this industry is only a conduit from 
the oil fields to the driver's tank, a means by which the oil companies compete to get 
the business of the ultimate consumer-the man in whose automobile the gas is used • 
. . . The retail stations, whether independent or company-owned, are the instrumentalities 
through which competition for this ultimate market is waged." 
48 McLEAN & HAIGH, op. cit. supra note 10, at 289. 
49 Id. at 290. . 
50 Attempts by the oil companies to control the resale price of gasoline through 
independent operators on a consignment basis may have unfavorable results. In Site 
Oil Co., 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (CCH Lab. Cas.) ,I 11432 (July 13, 1962), Site owned a 
gasoline station and leased it to the lessees for an indefinite period, subject to termina-
tion on thirty days notice. Site also retained the right to terminate upon twenty-four 
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chosen to market through independent retail dealers for these 
reasons, the oil companies should not now be allowed to deny 
their dealers' independent status in order to justify a price dis-
crimination in favor of one dealer at the expense of a number of 
others. 
The actual question presented in the Sun Oil case was whether 
the "good faith meeting of competition" defense was available to 
a supplier who reduced the price of its gasoline to one of its dealers 
engaged in a price battle with a station owned and operated by a 
competing supplier.51 The theory relied upon by the court of ap-
peals was that such a station represents competition for Sun itself, 
rather than merely for its dealer. There would, however, seem to 
be no logical difference, assuming one accepts the underlying ra-
tionale of the court with regard to the realities of competition, 
between a station owned and operated by the supplier and one 
leased to a dealer who theoretically sets his own price.52 If the 
dealer is merely a conduit when his competitor is a supplier-
retailer, it would seem that his status should not change merely 
because his competitor is a lessee-dealer. On review of the record, 
the Supreme Court found no evidence to justify the conclusion 
that Super Test was an integrated supplier-retailer. Rather, the 
Court found the Super Test station to be merely a retail com-
petitor of McLean. The Fifth Circuit decision was therefore 
reversed on the ground that the section 2(b) defense was not 
available to a supplier who gave a discriminatorily low price to 
one of its dealers to enable the dealer to meet his competition, 
when that competition is a competing retail dealer who "was not 
the beneficiary of any enabling price cut from its own supplier."53 
hours notice if the station were operated contrary to the !ease terms. The lease set the 
hours of operation and the price of the gasoline, and required that the operator get the 
prior approval of the company before he could sell any other products. The gasoline 
and oil were consigned to him, and he received a commission on what he sold. The NLRB 
held that "in view of the extensive control exercised or reserved by Site over all the 
aspects of the lessee's operations, . . . the lessees were not independent contractors but 
were employees of Site so that the individuals under their control were also Site em-
ployees." Id. ~ 11432, at 17771. The company was held liable for an unfair labor practice 
in refusing to bargain with the employees' union. 
51 This was the question presented to both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court. 
However, the Supreme Court asserted that there was no evidence in the record to support 
the conclusion that Super Test was an integrated supplier-retailer of gasoline. Hence, 
the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit upon the basis that Super Test was engaged 
solely in retail operations, as was McLean. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 512 (1963). 
52 Some writers have felt that the decision of the Fifth Circuit would apply equally 
to both situations. See ROWE 254 n.196; 75 HARv. L. REv. 429, 432 (1961). 
u3 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505,512 (1963). 
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Thus the Supreme Court answered the question not specifically 
considered by the court of appeals. It did not, however, address it-
self to the question which the Fifth Circuit did attempt to answer, 
i.e., whether the section 2(b) defense was available to a supplier 
to enable it to help one of its dealers meet the competition of 
a station owned and operated by a competing supplier.54 Theoreti-
cally, the question remains open. However, since the Fifth Circuit 
did answer this question, but did so upon the basis of the "con-
duit" theory, the rejection of that theory by the Supreme Court 
in its dicta would seem to resolve the very issue that they expressly 
claimed to leave undecided. "The 'conduit' theory ... would so 
expand the § 2 (b) defense as to effect a return to the broader 
'meeting competition' provision of the Clayton Act which the 
Robinson-Patman amendments superseded."55 
In addition to rejecting the "conduit" theory, the Supreme 
Court went on to answer a number of the arguments which the 
court of appeals used in rejecting the FTC's view of the section 
2(b) defense. Having assumed that Super Test was an integrated 
supplier-retailer, the court of appeals asserted that a narrow con-
struction of the section 2 (b) defense 
"violates the policy of the Act that places emphasis on in-
dividual competitive situations; focuses on injury to partic-
ular competitors rather than on the health of the competitive 
process; conflicts with the purpose of the Act to protect the 
small retailer; fosters vertical integration of retailing opera-
tions, jeopardizing the future of the non-major as well as the 
independent filling station operator; discourages sound mar-
keting in that it confers a competitive advantage on a supplier 
gaining trade by sporadic predatory low prices unrelated to 
economic factors, in the sense that a high-volume low-margin 
policy of a super-market is related to such economic factors 
as low cost efficiency of operation and the maximization of 
over-all profit; denies the realities of the market place in 
refusing to accept the undeniable fact that a supplier of 
gasoline competes with a supplier-retailer at the consumer 
level through filling station operators; tends to spread rather 
than localize price wars; and makes it impossible, as a prac-
tical matter, for a supplier to defend one of its filling stations, 
54 "Were it otherwise, i.e., if it appeared either that Super Test were an integrated 
supplier-retailer, or that it had received a price cut from its own supplier-presumably 
a competitor of Sun-we would be presented with a different case, as to which we herein 
neither express nor intimate any opinion." Id. at 512 n.7. 
55 Id. at 525. 
1963] COMMENTS 967 
fighting for survival, or even to defend itself against destruc-
tive price raids of a supplier-retailer."56 
If true, this would undeniably be a persuasive argument in favor 
of allowing the defense. However, the opposing argument seems 
to carry greater weight. 
Unquestionably Congress intended, by enacting the Robinson-
Patman Act, to protect small retailers like McLean. However, the 
purpose in protecting the individual was to protect the system. 
"[S]urely there is no more effective means of lessening competi-
tion or creating monopolies than the debilitation of a competi-
tor."57 Hence, the competitive process should be viewed as the 
sum of the individual competitive situations. By intending to pro-
tect the individual retailer, Congress did not intend to include, 
as a means of protection, those mechanisms which might injure 
other retailers by placing the stamp of legality upon price dis-
criminations against them. Although there is a tendency, for very 
good reason, to think of the competition in the gasoline market 
as being between suppliers, there is also a very vital competition 
existing between lessee-dealers of the same supplier in any com-
petitive area. If the intent of discriminatory price allowances is to 
protect retailers from the effects of price wars, it would seem that 
greater protection could be achieved by limiting their duration. 
When a dealer receives a subsidy from his supplier during a price 
war, it is usually granted so that the dealer, as well as the supplier, 
absorbs part of the loss resulting from the price reduction.58 Con-
sequently, the retailer has little incentive to prolong the price 
war since he is operating on a smaller profit margin. It is thus to 
his benefit to prevent the oil companies from subsidizing price 
wars,59 because of the tendency of subsidization to prolong them.60 
There is a real possibility that a narrow construction of the 
56 Sun Oil Co. v. ITC, 294 F.2d 465, 481 (5th Cir. 1961). The Fifth Circuit's opinion 
received considerable support from the writers as a realistic appraisal of the price war 
situation. E.g., ROWE 253. "[T]emporary cooperative pricing by supplier and dealer 
may become an indispensable defensive mechanism for meeting local price disruptions. 
Due to the limited resources of the typical dealer, the supplier must carry at least part 
of the financial burden of coping with cut-price competition as the price of economic 
survival. The alternative is a murder of middlemen, who are the supplier's lifeline to the 
market. In such commercial emergencies, therefore, the competition confronting the 
dealer becomes the supplier's price competition as we11, and the dealer's price in com-
mercial reality becomes also the supplier's price." Id. at 253-54. 
157 Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block&: Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). 
58 E.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1963). 
liD See S. REP. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1956). 
60 Id. at 19. 
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section 2(b) defense will tend to foster vertical integration of retail-
ing operations;61 but vertical integration followed neither from 
the outlawing by the Supreme Court of exclusive dealing contracts 
in the gasoline industry62 nor from the earlier denial of the sec-
tion 2(b) defense in Enterprise Industries. There is also the possi-
bility that supplier-retailers attempting to gain trade by sporadic 
predatory pricing may obtain a competitive advantage, but this 
practice, when it exceeds the limits of fair competitive pricing, may 
fall under the ban of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.63 In 
addition, it would not be impossible for a supplier to defend one of 
its stations caught in a price raid by a supplier-retailer, because the 
supplier could effect a general price reduction to all dealers within 
any particular competitive area without violating section 2(a).64 
That a broad construction of the section 2(b) defense would 
have a tendency to localize rather than spread price wars, as the 
court of appeals felt, does not seem to be a valid assumption. Even 
in the Sun Oil case itself the court of appeals admitted that Sun's 
discriminatory practice, which the defense would have made law-
ful, had no localizing .effect, but rather caused what had started out 
as a skirmish on one street corner to develop into "a full-scale 
price war" in the area.65 The Supreme Court decision in Sun Oil 
does not by any means settle all of the questions as to the scope 
of the section 2(b) defense, but it does seem to lend considerable 
weight to the FTC view that, at least where both dealers are in-
dependent retailers, the section 2(b) defense is available to a sup-
plier aiding a dealer only where the dealer has received a lower 
61 The court of :ippeals failed to indicate what harm vertical integration would create 
in this situation. Vertical integration may be attacked under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 64 
Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), to prevent a lessening of competition. If, as the 
Fifth Circuit assumes, the only competition is among suppliers, then vertical integration 
which would eliminate competition only at the dealer level would have no adverse effect. 
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1962). 
62 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). It should be noted that for 
all practical purposes the oil companies were able to achieve their purpose by using 
tying clauses in their leases. See note 23 supra. 
63 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1958). Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act 
is a criminal statute, and can be enforced only by the Justice Department and the United 
States attorneys. The Federal Trade Commission, however, has no authority to enforce 
§ 3; nor is it one of the antitrust laws the violation of which gives a private party the 
right to sue for treble damages or injunctive relief. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 
355 U.S. 373 (1958). In a criminal prosecution for selling at unreasonably low prices for 
the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor, National Dairy 
Products Corporation challenged the constitutionality of § 3. In a 6-to-3 decision, the 
Supreme Court held that the section was not so vague as to be void or unconstitutional. 
United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4218 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1963). 
64 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 527 (1963). 
65 Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (1963). 
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offer from another supplier. 66 The justification for allowing such 
a price discrimination is basically simple. Although the favored 
dealer would receive a competitive advantage over non-favored 
dealers in that he could sell for less, there are balancing factors in 
that (1) the favored dealer, having already received a lower offer, 
could in any event sell for less than the non-favored dealers, and 
(2) the supplier is not deprived of a customer. While the defense, 
when so restricted, seems hollow because gasoline dealers do not 
generally receive offers from competing suppliers, desirable loca-
tions are often at a premium, and some dealers who own their 
stations are free to change suppliers. 61 
B. The Lawful Lower Price Requirement 
A seller charged by the FTC with violating section 2(a) must 
bear the burden of proving all the elements of the section 2(b) 
defense. 68 One of the elements to be proved is that the reduction 
in price was made in good faith to meet a competitor's lawful 
lower price. 69 The defense is not available to a seller who meets a 
competitor's lower price which the seller knows or has reason to 
believe is illegal.7° This problem rather clearly arises in the gaso-
line price discrimination situation because of the existence of in-
dependent brands which normally sell in competition with the 
major brands only at a price differential.11 Thus, if a major brand 
drops its price to meet exactly the price of an independent brand, 
it will be more than "meeting" competition,72 because the in-
dependent normally sells at a lower price. Such a price cut is 
66 Another requirement imposed upon the defense by the FTC is that it be used only 
to retain old customers rather than to obtain new customers. However, in Sunshine 
Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962), the court held that the language of 
the Clayton Act pertaining to meeting the lower prices of competitors did not limit 
a manufacturer to granting discounts only to retain customers, but could grant them 
to certain purchasers who up to that time were not its customers, in order to obtain 
them as customers. 
67 There is some indication that in certain situations suppliers do compete for 
efficient accounts. See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 524 n.13 (1963); CAssADY, PRICE 
MAKING AND PRICE BEHAVIOR IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 58-61 (1954); McLEAN & HAIGH, 
THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES 270-71 (1954); l "WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES 
178 (1958). 
68 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951). See Comment, Price Discrimina-
tion in Gasoline Marketing: The Detroit Jobbers Case, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 58, 66 (1951). 
60 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, supra note 68, at 242. 
70 Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956); American Oil Co., 3 TRADE 
REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1115961, at 20789 (FTC June 27, 1962), appeal docketed, 3 TRADE 
REG. REP. 25901 (7th Cir. March 4, 1963). 
71 See text supra at 959. 
72 It may, in fact, be predatory pricing in violation of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1958). See note 63 supra. 
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"beating" competition, because it is unnecessary for the seller of 
the premium product to match the lower price of an off-brand 
product in order to retain or gain business. Such a lower price 
manifests a lack of good faith and should not provide a defense 
against a section 2(a) violation.73 Nor can a seller which reduces its 
prices to compete with another seller which illegally reduced its 
price to meet the price of an off-brand avail itself of the section 
2(b) defense. This was the situation in the American Oil Co. case, 
where American had reduced its price to meet the lower price of 
a competitor, Shell; but the Commission held that Shell's price was 
illegaF4 because it was meeting the price of Paraland, an independ-
ent brand.75 
In a very vigorous dissent in the American Oil Co. case, Com-
missioner Elman eloquently presented arguments which seriously 
challenge the majority view. "Section 2(a) requires that probable 
competitive injury derive from the discrimination or difference in 
price charged to different buyers."76 Thus, since American's price 
reductions to its Smyrna dealers were made only after competing 
suppliers and dealers had made equally large price reductions, the 
diversion of customers from American's Marietta dealers would 
have taken place regardless of the prices charged to the Smyrna 
dealers.77 Elman also criticized the majority finding that American 
was meeting a price which they knew or should have known was 
illegal. 
"This seems to me to place an unrealistic and competitively 
unfair burden on businessmen. 'Good faith' does not require 
businessmen to be put in the impossible dilemma of either 
(1) losing business by not meeting competitors' lower prices, 
or (2) meeting the competitive lower prices and running the 
risk that years later the Commission will find these 'third 
73 See FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510, 514-15 n.7(c) (2d Cir. 1951); Porto 
Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
279 U.S. 858 (1929); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 396 (1948), 
rev'd in part, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). See 
AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN 
Acr 100 (2d rev. ed. 1959). 
74 Although the Commission held that Shell's price was illegal, and that the meeting 
of this illegal price was the basis for issuing a cease and desist order against American 
Oil, a complaint was not issued against Shell until after the order was issued in the 
American Oil case. Shell Oil Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) ,I 16132 (FTC Oct. 16, 
1962). 
75 American Oil Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) ~ 15961, at 20788 (FTC June 27, 
1962), appeal docketed, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 25901 (7th Cir. March 4, 1963). 
76 Id. at 20794. 
77 Ibid. 
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party' prices to be unlawful, after complex and protracted 
proceedings whose outcome could not confidently be pre-
dicted even by legal experts specializing in the field of trade 
regulation. "78 
Elman's dissent also contains a suggestion that perhaps this was a 
situation in which a good defense could be made on the basis of 
the "changing conditions" proviso of section 2(a), because "Amer-
ican's price cuts to Smyrna dealers were its competitive response 
to dynamic market conditions which it did not create and over 
whose rapid changes it had no control."79 
IV. THE PRIVATE BRAND PROBLEM 
In the American Oil Co. case, the independent Paraland station 
was alleged to have been owned by, or affiliated with, a major oil 
company, Phillips Petroleum.80 This allegation raises another 
significant problem with regard to price discrimination in gasoline 
marketing-whether it is a violation of section 2(a) for a major 
brand supplier to sell gasoline to independent stations for less than 
it sells identical gasoline to its own lessee-dealers.81 
"Section 2(a) confines the statute to discriminations 'between 
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality.' "82 
The key question is whether differences in packaging or labeling 
of the same goods are sufficient to take the goods out of the "like 
· grade and quality" category. There is no doubt that different labels 
affect consumer acceptance and, consequently, the price a con-
sumer will pay for a branded item. A heavily advertised, well-
kno-trn brand can usually sell in larger volume even at a higher 
price than an identical product sold under an off-brand name.83 
78 Id. at 20796. 
79 Id. at 20794. 
80 See note 38 supra. According to 1960 financial data, Phillips Petroleum was the 
eighth largest of the integrated oil companies. Among United States industrial corpora-
tion of all types, it ranked seventeenth in assets, and thirty-first in sales. HouSE SELECT 
COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION: 
ACQUISmONS OF 500 l.ARGESI' INDUSTRIAL AND 50 LARGESI' MERCHANDISING FIRMS 31 (Comm. 
Print 1962). 
81 One other problem which this allegation raises, but which will not be discussed, 
is whether ownership by a major oil company is sufficient to take that brand or station 
out of the off-brand classification and put it into the major brand category. Such a 
change in classification would affect the illegality of meeting the lower price on the part 
of other major brands. 
82 A.G. REP. 156. For a discussion of "like grade and quality," see Cassady & Grether, 
The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section 
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 241 (1957). 
83 See Trumbull, Consumers Speak, Food Field Rep., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 7, where the 
writer reports that, on the basis of a survey of U.S. homemakers' opinions of national brands 
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However, the FTC has, in several decisions, disregarded brand 
names and labels and promotional distinctions in deciding that 
physically identical products are of "like grade and quality."84 As 
a result of this interpretation, the Commission has attacked these 
price variations even though the goods were aimed at a distinctive 
market or purchaser class.85 This approach received the approval 
of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Anti-
trust Laws.86 However, the Committee took the position that con-
sumer preferences as between branded and unbranded items 
should be considered in determining whether the price differential 
could be "cost" justified87 on the basis of savings in distribution 
costs "incurred through the promotional expenditures of mer-
chandising a nationally advertised branded item,"88 or whether 
there has been the required statutory "injury"89 to competition, 
i.e., where the price differentials between the branded and un-
branded items "reflect no more than the spread between the prices 
the public will pay for the one as against the other, no 'injury' to 
competition should reasonably be found."90 
In the gasoline industry, although a number of the majors 
supply gasoline to the independents91 at prices below those at 
which they sell gasoline of "like grade and quality" to their own 
lessee-dealers, the FTC has not been challenging this practice as 
versus private brands in the grocery product industry, "an overwhelming majority are 
convinced a well-known national-brand name product is a higher quality than an un-
known or private brand. Furthermore, they are willing to pay more for the brand 
name.0 
84 For a criticism of the FTC's policy with regard to brand names, see RowE 69-73; 
Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1 (1956). 
85 E.g., E. Edelmann & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978 (1955); Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 
(1953); U.S. Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998, 1006-08 (1950); U.S. Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 
1500 (1939); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232, 290 (1936), rev'd on other 
grounds, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939). See A.G. REP. 157; ROWE 69. 
86 "[T)he economic factors inherent in brand names and national advertising should 
not be considered in the jurisdictional inquiry under the statutory 'like grade and quality' 
test .... [A)bandonment of a physical test of like grade and quality in favor of a market• 
ing comparison of intrinsically identical goods might not only enmesh the administrators 
of the statute in complex economic investigations for every price discrimination charge, 
but also could encourage easy evasion of the statute through artificial variations in the 
packaging, advertising or design of goods which the seller wishes to distribute at dif• 
ferential prices." A.G. REP. 158-59. 
87 For a discussion of the "cost justification" defense, see generally id. at 170-76; 
AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 73, at 59-79; RoWE 265-312. 
88 A.G. REP. 159. 
89 For a discussion of the "injury" requirement, see generally id. at 160-70; AusrIN, 
op. cit. supra note 73, at 40-52. 
90 A.G. REP. 159. 
91 See text supra at 957-58. 
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a violation of section 2(a). A major reason explaining the FTC's 
failure to attack this practice is that consumer acceptance of 
branded and unbranded gasoline is such that the two are not 
considered to be in competition with one another and, hence, 
there is no requisite injury to competition. It has been seriously 
proposed that, with respect to gasoline, if the major brand name 
is removed, a lower price to an unbranded retailer "is not dis-
criminatory, strictly speaking, . . . since a different and inferior 
product in the economic sense is being sold."92 The fallacy in the 
argument that there is no competition and hence no injury should 
be obvious. If there were no competition between branded and 
unbranded gasolines, there should logically be no price wars 
sparked by private brand stations. A distinction should be drawn 
between the absence of competition and an absence, in an estab-
lished price differential situation, of any significant or noticeable 
shift in business. Any appreciable shift in either direction of the 
established two-cent differential between the major brands and 
the independent brands quickly demonstrates a very vigorous 
competition between them. The competition which exists is 
merely modified or nullified by the price differential. 93 
Nor should there be any question as to the actual injury caused 
by such a discrimination.94 If an independent station exists along-
side a major brand station and does any business at all, some of it 
will probably come from sales lost by the major. Any loss by the 
major station to the independent is an injury caused by the lower 
price of the independent made possible by the lower price paid 
by the independent to the major supplier. The injury can be em-
phasized by assuming that the independent drops his price a cent 
02 Dirlam &: Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L.J. 
818, 833 n.48 (1952). 
03 Cf. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). In trying 
to define the relevant product market, the Court discussed the competition which exists 
between various cellophane substitutes and cellophane itself at various prices. "An 
element for consideration as to cross-elasticity of demand between products is the re-
sponsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the other. If a slight decrease 
in the price of [one] causes a considerable number of customers of [the] other ... to 
switch ... , it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists between 
them; that the products compete in the same market." Id. at 400. 
94 See, e,g., ITC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1963). In any event, actual 
injury need not be proved in a case involving price discrimination on the secondary 
level, as there is a reasonable possibility that competition may be adversely affected by 
a manufacturer or producer selling to one customer at substantially lower prices than 
it sells to the competitors of the customer if the price differential is sufficient to influence 
their resale prices. ITC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). A diversion of business 
or loss of profits is enough to establish a violation. Com Prods. Ref. Co. v. ITC, 324 U.S. 
726, 742 (1945); General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956). 
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or two below the already existing two-cent differential, compensat-
ing for the loss in profit margin by increased sales volume. Any 
argument that there is no injury would seem to be extremely 
naive.95 Even if it could be shown that there is no injury to com-
petition on the secondary level, a recent FTC decision96 raises the 
question of whether this type of dual marketing price discrimina-
tion is not vulnerable to attack as being injurious to competition 
on the primary level. The Borden Company was packaging and 
selling evaporated milk under its own "Borden" label and also 
under purchasers' private labels. In reversing the hearing examin-
er's dismissal of the charges, the Commission by a two-to-one deci-
sion97 ruled that Borden was engaged in illegal price discrimina-
tion by charging substantially higher prices for its "Borden" label 
evaporated milk than for milk of "like grade and quality" sold 
under private labels. The Commission found that the immediate 
competitive effect of Borden's entry into the private label field 
was to cause a number of midwest competitors to lose substantial 
sales and accounts to Borden, and held that these unjustified price 
differentials may substantially lessen competition with Borden 
and its wholesale and retail customers. Arguably, the dual market-
ing conducted by some of the major oil companies could have the 
same effect upon independent refiners and jobbers as in the 
Borden case. If competition from the independent refiners could 
be eliminated, then the competition with the major brand service 
stations by the off-brand retailers would stand on a rather weak 
foundation. The Commission's opinion in the Borden case does 
not indicate that any attempt was made to defend the price dis-
crimination on the basis of the section 2(b) "meeting competition" 
defense. Certainly this defense would be raised if the dual market-
ing of the major oil companies were to be challenged. At first 
glance, this would appear to be the precise question raised in 
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC.98 It was there held that section 2(b) was 
a complete defense to a charge of violating section 2(a), notwith-
standing that the Commission proves an injury to competition.99 
The Court indicated that it was a "complete defense to a charge 
of price discrimination for the seller to show that its price dif-
95 See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., supra note 94, at 508-09. 
96 The Borden Co., 3 TRADE R.Ec. REP. (Trade Cas.) ,I 16191 (ITC Nov. 28, 1962). 
'97 Commissioner Elman dissented without opinion, and Commissioners Higgenbotham 
and Anderson did not participate. 
98 340 U.S. 231 (1951). 
'90 Id. at 246-47. 
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ferential has been made in good faith to meet a lawful and equally 
low price of a competitor."100 
In deciding whether the section 2(b) defense may be used in 
this situation, a determination would have to be made as to 
whether the sale of gasoline of "like grade and quality" by a 
major oil company to an independent retailer or jobber is a sale 
of a "premium brand" gasoline. This determination is significant, 
because it is unlawful for the manufacturer of a premium brand 
to lower its prices to meet exactly the price of an off-brand which 
normally sells at a lower price. The "good faith" defense is for 
"meeting" not "beating" competition. With regard to the defini-
tion of a premium product, it has been said that "the ultimate 
test ... is whether a substantial part of the public is prepared to 
pay a greater price for the ... product."101 Under the cases deciding 
that items are of "like grade and quality" even though sold under 
a private label, it would seem that the premium brand clearly 
retains its quality of "premiumness." 
From the standpoint of the economics of marketing, it has been 
argued that, because of the inelasticity of supply of gasoline, the oil 
companies should be permitted to engage in this kind of dual 
marketing because it enables them to dispose of gasoline supplies 
not salable through their normal channels.102 But considering the 
economic realities of the gasoline market, this kind of price dis-
crimination should not go unchallenged. Since both the demand 
for and the supply of gasoline are relatively inelastic, every gallon 
of gasoline sold as unbranded means a gallon less that can be sold 
as branded. The costs of advertising and promoting the brand 
name are thus shifted to and borne by a lesser volume of branded 
gasoline, thereby, in an illogical sort of way, leading to the argu-
ment that the price differential is cost-justified.103 As the pressure 
100 Id. at 246. 
101 Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 
1958). 
102 See CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS 416 (1923). "'Discrimina-
tion is the secret of efficiency.' ... The economic basis of it is simple. Existing business 
may or may not cover all overhead costs, but in either case, if there is spare capacity, 
added business will cause no added overhead, and will be a gain at anything above dif-
ferential cost, so long as it can be kept separate from existing business, so that existing 
earnings are not impaired." 
103 But see RowE 72-73. "Since the cold fact is that the public will pay more money 
for a nationally advertised and branded version than it would pay for the physically 
same but promotionally unknown product sans brand, a manufacturer who sells a 
branded and an unbranded variation of the same basic item at a price differential is 
not 'discriminating' in any economic sense. The purchaser of the unbranded version of 
the seller's product naturally pays less because he gets less. Either he buys cheaper what 
he must resell cheaper-under its own private brand at a corresponding price spread 
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to dispose of surplus gasoline increases because of reduced branded 
sales, the majors will probably be willing to dispose of their excess 
at even lower prices to the independents, thus increasing the po-
tentiality for price war instability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Price discrimination in the marketing of gasoline, as well as 
attempts at price fixing104 or price maintenance,1°5 are directly 
attributable to the excess supply of gasoline available. The prob-
lem is not new106 but, in the absence of corrective congressional 
action, it shows little sign of abating.107 Until the demand for gaso-
line comes to equal the supply, or the supply can be controlled 
either voluntarily by the oil producers or compulsorily by direct 
government regulation and control, economic pressure and the 
realities of the market will force the major oil companies to seek 
and resort to practices which may have a predatory effect tending 
to drive the independent refiners and distributors from the mar-
ket.1os 
Price discrimination is also used by the major oil companies 
as a means of maintaining a uniform retail price among all their 
dealers as well as a weapon to discipline off-brand dealers who at-
tempt to increase the traditional price differential. The net effect 
of such activities is to reduce price competition on the retail level 
below the manufacturer's nationally promoted product which enjoys greater consumer 
appeal. Or he may have to offset the initial price quotation in his favor by his expenditures 
in promoting his own private brand to match the supplier's appeal in the market. In 
short, the price differential in either event-unless disproportionately exceeding the con• 
sumer preference margin for the manufacturer's brand-bestows no net competitive ad-
vantage on the purchaser." 
104 One element of the price discrimination cases usually involves an allegation of 
price fixing as well as price discrimination. See, e.g., complaint issued in Shell Oil Co., 
FTC Docket 8537, Count II, Oct. 16, 1962. 
105 E.g., Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 3 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1f 16128 (FTC Oct. 5, 
1962) (initial decision dismissing the complaint), petition for appeal filed, BNA ANTITR.usr 
TRADE REG. REP. No. 69, at C-1 (Oct. 25, 1962). 
106 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
107 "The oil industry in general is troubled with excess production and capacity, and 
we see no immediate hope of things improving." Statement by John Harbin, Vice Presi-
dent of Halliburton Co., Dallas, Tex., in Time, Dec. 21, 1962, p. 69. 
108 See, e.g., The Pure Oil Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1f 16111 (FTC Sept. 28, 
1962), appeal granted, BNA ANTITRusr TRADE REG. REP. No. 76, at C-1 (Dec. 18, 1962). 
The hearing examiner ruled that the price reductions granted by Pure to its gasoline 
dealers in the Birmingham, Alabama, area, and its plan to narrow the prevailing price 
differential between its gasoline and the private brands allegedly injured private brand 
dealers. The hearing examiner found that Pure's plan to maintain a 1¢ differential 
"was so designed as to have the ultimate and inevitable effect of driving the private 
brand distributors out of the market." Id. at 20929. 
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among gasoline stations.109 Since the only price competition that 
exists in the gasoline market, except for that resulting from in-
dividual dealers who are willing to cut their profit margins to 
increase sales, is provided by the independent brands, 110 this com-
petition must be protected. This can be done presently only by 
protecting non-majors from unfair methods of competition 
through vigorous enforcement of the Robinson-Patman amend-
ment to section 2 of the Clayton Act.111 
Howard R. Lurie, S.Ed. 
109 H.R. REP. No. 1423, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1955). "[O]il company suppliers, for 
the avowed purpose of having their dealers reduce their retail prices at particular loca-
tions 'to meet the competition' of a dealer selling at a lower non-discriminatory price, 
including off-brand gasoline, have held the level of their prices generally while at the 
same time cutting their prices to one or more dealers at a particular location. In such 
situations the lower price has prevailed until the low-price off-brand dealer saw fit to 
increase his price. This policy or practice has had the immediate effect of fomenting 
price wars among the retail dealers, and resulting ultimately in eliminating a substantial 
amount of price competition between and among both brand and off-brand gasoline." 
110 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 523 (1963). 
111 One result of the Supreme Court's Sun Oil decision may be to spark an investiga-
tion in Congress into the oil industry to determine the extent to which the major oil 
companies arc supplying gasoline to both sides in price wars. See statement of Rep. 
James Roosevelt, 109 CONG. REc. A212 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1963). 
